The countries you would worry about knowing you used tor would use a wrench attack for any decryption or would simply lock you up anyway.
But I think this is a red herring, tor users probably dont want little-t tor and would use Tor Browser Bundle encrypted in ~/.local/bin
If you're running a relay then traffic gives you away. For tor on netbsd with a typical install it'll land in /usr/pkg bin and etc folders with data in /var/chroot/tor logging to /var/log/tor and usual script /etc/rc.d/tor and its own user and group tor.
Only FDE would hide that but thats a different threat model entirely.
Honestly, if I'm living under an authoritarian state and my threat model while using Tor included the state, the only OS I would even consider using for it is a heavily hardened Qubes-Whonix.
Forgot about Tails. No hate for Tails, per se. Tails and Whonix serve somewhat different niches and threat models, I suppose. Qubes/Whonix is more general purpose and designed for defense in depth against exploitation through virtualization, isolation, zero trust, whereas Tails is designed for deniability by being amnesic and booted off USB, and is much more light-weight, obviously. I guess it depends what you're doing on Tor. If you're handling a bunch of untrusted files Tails gets kinda sketchy because if the files contain malware, you're one priv esc/kernel exploit away from being deanonymised because afaik Tails has no virtualization. Qubes is much nicer for that type of task, but it's also unwieldy and not particularly good at being amnesic, though it can be made amnesic with a ton of manual configuration I'm sure.
"tor" is not a system package on my system. I would install it in /home/not-tor and I switch to the not-tor user when I wanted to use tor, if I did, which I don't.
I do not think "system packages" are usefully secret and there are many downsides to treating them as such, so I am satisfied just verifying they have not been tampered with, but you can encrypt other disk slices too if you feel super strongly about this.
People think that they can just stay in the good graces of facists. A facist is like a primate holding a machine gun. There's nothing rational about how it chooses its targets. And its aim is not particularly sharp, so expect to catch strays. You know, collateral damage?
> The device is stolen or lost and its contents must remain secret.
Seems this page uses a weak notion of "secret contents", since it doesn't encrypt the system packages, only user data and some configuration files.
Maybe I don't want anybody to know I have installed Tor on my system, in some countries this is illegal.
The countries you would worry about knowing you used tor would use a wrench attack for any decryption or would simply lock you up anyway. But I think this is a red herring, tor users probably dont want little-t tor and would use Tor Browser Bundle encrypted in ~/.local/bin
If you're running a relay then traffic gives you away. For tor on netbsd with a typical install it'll land in /usr/pkg bin and etc folders with data in /var/chroot/tor logging to /var/log/tor and usual script /etc/rc.d/tor and its own user and group tor.
Only FDE would hide that but thats a different threat model entirely.
Honestly, if I'm living under an authoritarian state and my threat model while using Tor included the state, the only OS I would even consider using for it is a heavily hardened Qubes-Whonix.
Not even Tails?
https://tails.net/
Forgot about Tails. No hate for Tails, per se. Tails and Whonix serve somewhat different niches and threat models, I suppose. Qubes/Whonix is more general purpose and designed for defense in depth against exploitation through virtualization, isolation, zero trust, whereas Tails is designed for deniability by being amnesic and booted off USB, and is much more light-weight, obviously. I guess it depends what you're doing on Tor. If you're handling a bunch of untrusted files Tails gets kinda sketchy because if the files contain malware, you're one priv esc/kernel exploit away from being deanonymised because afaik Tails has no virtualization. Qubes is much nicer for that type of task, but it's also unwieldy and not particularly good at being amnesic, though it can be made amnesic with a ton of manual configuration I'm sure.
Tails makes sense for people who don't need to edit local files
"tor" is not a system package on my system. I would install it in /home/not-tor and I switch to the not-tor user when I wanted to use tor, if I did, which I don't.
I do not think "system packages" are usefully secret and there are many downsides to treating them as such, so I am satisfied just verifying they have not been tampered with, but you can encrypt other disk slices too if you feel super strongly about this.
I think leaving system packages out in the open legitimately makes evil maid attacks significantly simpler.
You can use veriexec to validate executables prior them starting. I have used it and it works fine.
https://man.netbsd.org/veriexec.8
https://man.netbsd.org/veriexecgen.8
And where is the trust store database stored by default?
Then install it in $HOME ?
if the country would try to jail you for binary existing on the system they'd find a way to jail you for running netbsd alone
People think that they can just stay in the good graces of facists. A facist is like a primate holding a machine gun. There's nothing rational about how it chooses its targets. And its aim is not particularly sharp, so expect to catch strays. You know, collateral damage?
Said countries would hit you with a wrench until you give them your encryption keys or charge you for encrypting your disk in the first place anyway.
I really appreciate the citation needed link