Someone reported java4shell bug in September 2026

(github.com)

113 points | by notmine1337 4 hours ago ago

28 comments

  • wood_spirit an hour ago ago

    So the implication is that the LLM that assisted the Calif researchers might have read this previous bug report and not independently discovered it?

    • cryptonector 28 minutes ago ago

      Idk that u/notmine1337 meant that. I have questions:

      - why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?

      - why was this closed [by the submitter]?

      For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.

      • jakewins 2 minutes ago ago

        Why it was closed, surely, was because the only reaction to the PR was a bot saying it will automatically close the PR soon because of inactivity?

        I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.

        Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”

        Much much better outcomes that way.

  • darkamaul 25 minutes ago ago

    We will never know, but there is a chance that the Calif's researcher model decided to look at the open and closed issues / PRs of the repo.

    Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.

  • rzmmm an hour ago ago

    From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."

    Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.

    • rfgplk an hour ago ago

      > From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."

      I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015: "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."

      Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.

      • xmodem 27 minutes ago ago

        "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries." is a nonsensical sentence as written, but a colleague who told me they had done this would be telling me a vastly different thing to if they had told me they had compiled the source code to a physics engine.

        There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.

      • LoganDark 36 minutes ago ago

        > Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.

        I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.

      • p-e-w 38 minutes ago ago

        A frontier AI is nothing like a compiler. The litmus test is how much expertise was required to get it to find the results. If a basic prompt brings up an industry-shaking vulnerability of this caliber, then the human was at best a janitor.

      • NooneAtAll5 41 minutes ago ago

        no, it's more like "I worked on physics engine. Well, more precisely, I used already made library and never even looked at actual physics"

  • elashri 2 hours ago ago

    This person is a member of OpenJDK organization and a contributer but not sure if he is oracle employee.

    • egorfine an hour ago ago

      None of this did help: nobody gave a flying f.

      • bobmcnamara an hour ago ago

        Someone probably gave a maintainer "the talk"

  • InsidiousWombat an hour ago ago

    Nice proof that the auto-close bots are literal cancer on project that make stuff worse.

    It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.

    But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are

    • stickfigure 44 minutes ago ago

      Agreed, but in this case it looks like the submitter closed it? What's that about?

      • dboreham 34 minutes ago ago

        They knew about the fix coming?

        • cryptonector 27 minutes ago ago

          That's my guess. But also opening a public issue was a faux pas.

    • dboreham 34 minutes ago ago

      A project with auto bug close signals to me that it is badly managed and hence should be used with caution.

    • cryptonector 42 minutes ago ago

      It wasn't auto-closed.

    • frangonf 33 minutes ago ago

      Even Duke gave up on the current state of software.

      Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?

    • bombcar 42 minutes ago ago

      Grab a billion tokens and farm auto-closed GitHub issues. Become HN famous for a day.

  • fulafel 2 hours ago ago

    It's even titled buffer overflow.

  • yread 2 hours ago ago

    They even used the same example as Calif: AAA....A=.

    • Alifatisk 2 hours ago ago

      Using As when fiddling with the memory is common. Nothing unique to Calif.

      • rustyhancock an hour ago ago

        Yes, especially in past decades when it's easy to spot 41414141 on the stack in a debugger.

        You might follow up with a De Bruijn/cyclic pattern and can see the overflow happen by step1 and precisely locate it by what replaces the A's.

        https://youtu.be/L2j90atBpRU?is=q6W_1eF4viMoKZEA

        Didn't the Alpine Linux bug also use A's for the exploit to login as root?

      • gruez an hour ago ago

        Not to mention it's the first letter in the base64 alphabet, so if you want a bunch of zeroes, that's how you get it.

        • echoangle an hour ago ago

          Today I learned that the Base64 Alphabet doesn't start with the numbers so A is 0 And 0 is 52.

      • layer8 an hour ago ago

        Except that in Base64 it’s not the alternating bit pattern of hex A (binary 0101), which is the property one uses it for in memory, but instead decodes to all-zeros (and is binary 01000001 in ASCII before decoding).